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ScienceDirectEmpathy, compassion and Theory of Mind (ToM) are central
topics in social psychology and neuroscience. While empathy
enables the sharing of others’ emotions and may result in
empathic distress, a maladaptive form of empathic resonance,
or compassion, a feeling of warmth and concern for others,
ToM provides cognitive understanding of someone else’s
thoughts or intentions. These socio-affective and socio-
cognitive routes to understanding others are subserved by
separable, independent brain networks. Nonetheless they are
jointly required in many complex social situations. A process
that is critical for both, empathy and ToM, is self-other
distinction, which is implemented in different temporoparietal
brain regions. Thus, adaptive social behavior is a result of
dynamic interplay of socio-affective and socio-cognitive
processes.
Addresses
1Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences,
Stephanstraße 1A, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
2 Institute of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, Department of
Psychology, Technische Universita¨t Dresden, Dresden, Germany
Corresponding author: Preckel, Katrin (preckel@cbs.mpg.de)
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6
This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion-memory
interactions
Edited by Mara Mather and Michael Fanselow
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 31st July 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010
2352-1546/ã 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
As a social species, humans are continuously required to
process complex social signals. Successful multifaceted
social interactions are enabled by socio-affective and
socio-cognitive capacities such as empathy, compassion
and Theory of Mind (ToM). In this review we will first
define these social functions and describe the neural
networks associated with each of them. Further, we
discuss the interaction of empathy and ToM and delin-
eate the importance of one crucial process, that is, self-
other distinction. Socio-affective and socio-cognitive pro-
cesses are also essential for how (prosocially) we interact
with others, particularly when faced with others’ suffer-
ing. Two possible outcomes of empathic sharing of
others’ suffering are empathic distress on the one hand,www.sciencedirect.com which may be detrimental to the observer and to others
and compassion, on the other hand, which is a feeling of
warmth and concern for the other. We conclude with a
concise summary and an opinion statement.
Defining and neurally characterizing empathy,
compassion and Theory of Mind
Empathy describes the process of sharing feelings, that is,
resonating with someone else’s feelings, regardless of
valence (positive/negative), but with the explicit knowl-
edge that the other person is the origin of this emotion [1].
This socio-affective process results from neural network
activations that resemble those activations observed
when the same emotion is experienced first-hand (shared
network hypothesis) [2–5]. The first studies in neurosci-
ence targeting empathy investigated empathy in the
domain of pain, showing that directly experiencing pain
and witnessing another person receiving painful stimuli
results in shared neural activations in the anterior insula
(AI) and anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC) [6,7].
Meta-analyses have later identified these regions as a core
network that is activated whenever we witness the suf-
fering of others [8,9]. Furthermore, this network is mod-
ulated by individual differences in experienced negative
affect and empathy [6,10]. While empathy refers to an
isomorphic representation of someone else’s affective
state, compassion is a complementary social emotion
elicited by witnessing the suffering of others and is rather
associated with feelings of concern and warmth, linked to
the motivation to help [2,11]. Empathy and compassion
also differ on a neural level: compassion activates net-
works that have previously been associated with reward
and affiliation processes including the ventral striatum
(VS), the nucleus accumbens, the ventral tegmental area
(VTA), the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and the
subgenual anterior cingulate (sgACC)
[12,13,14,15,16,17]. Congruently with these activations
in reward-associated and affiliation-associated networks,
compassion generates positive affect towards others’ suf-
fering. In contrast to compassion, empathic distress,
which is an alternative outcome of empathy, may be
detrimental to the experiencer as well as to the suffering
other [15,18].
In contrast to socio-affective processes, socio-cognition
refers to taking another person’s perspective (also
referred to as ToM, mentalizing, or cognitive empathy).
Rather than an emotional state, ToM yields abstract,
propositional knowledge about the other’s mental state.
It describes the process of inferring and reasoning aboutCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6
2 Emotion-memory interactionsthe beliefs, thoughts or emotions of others [19–22]. Cru-
cial brain regions involved in ToM include the ventral
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus
(STS), temporal poles (TP), medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) and precuneus/posterior cingulate (PCC) [23].
Interactions of social affect and social
cognition
Both socio-affective and socio-cognitive processes have
been extensively investigated [6,8,9,23,24]. However,
research has only recently begun to study how these
processes are related and work together to achieve adap-
tive social behavior. Making use of a novel task (Empa-
ToM) [25] that stimulates both functions concurrently
(see Figure 1), the respective neural correlates can be
directly compared. The EmpaToM clearly activates sep-
arable brain networks that can be replicated in resting
state functional connectivity [25] and on a brain struc-
tural level [26]. Crucially, individual differences in
empathy and ToM are unrelated on a behavioral and
neural level, that is, strong empathizers are notFigure 1
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The EmpaToM task. This figure presents the experimental set-up of the Em
(emotionality of video)  2 (ToM requirements) design, resulting in four diffe
negative and neutral videos, as well as videos with ToM requirements or fac
a valence rating (ranging from negative to positive) and a compassion rating
in the video. Afterwards they answered a question that either probed for To
how confident they felt about their answer. For further information on this ta
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6 necessarily proficient mentalizers [27]. In line with such
independent functions, selective impairments in empa-
thy or ToM have been observed in different psycho-
pathologies such as autism and psychopathy. In autism,
ToM is deficient [28–31], while no empathy deficits are
observed when controlling for alexithymia [32–35]. In
psychopathy or chronic aggression, in contrast, ToM is
intact, but the propensity to empathize with others is
reduced [36,37].
Despite being separable, empathy and ToM are jointly
required in many complex social situations. An indirect
source of evidence for such co-activation is a meta-analy-
sis on different empathy for pain paradigms, which sug-
gests that the core region of the ToM network is co-
activated in empathy paradigms when additional inferring
from a cue is required to understand the other’s state. [8].
The paradigms investigated in this meta-analysis varied
depending on the information provided to the partici-
pants. In picture-based paradigms, they were presented
with visual depictions of someone in a painful situation,4 s1-3 s max. 15 s 0-2 s
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paToM task (previously published here [25]). The design is a 2
rent video types. Each actor presented each video type: emotional
tual reasoning demands. Each video was followed by various ratings,
 (ranging from none to very much compassion they felt for the person
M or factual reasoning. After each question, participants were asked
sk, please refer to Kanske et al. [25].
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On the interaction of social affect and cognition Preckel, Kanske and Singer 3whereas in cue-based paradigms, participants were pre-
sented a cue/hint that someone else is receiving painful
stimulation. Common activations were observed in the
typical empathy related core network. However, the two
paradigm types resulted in different co-activations. As the
cue-based paradigms require additional inference of the
other’s affective state from an abstract cue, the ToM
related network is co-active [8]. The pictorial presenta-
tion of someone in a painful situation, on the other hand,
co-activates the action-observation network to decode the
potential affective consequences of a certain action.
These findings suggest that, dependent on the provided
information in a given context, different networks will be
co-activated together with the core empathy-related
network.
The two networks associated with empathy and ToM are
also jointly activated for complex evaluations of someone
else’s feelings such as empathic accuracy, the ability to
infer what someone else is feeling [38]. Here, participants
are asked to continuously rate another person’s emotions
over an extended period of time; so the emotion of the
other may be empathically shared, but it is also critical to
acquire abstract knowledge about that emotion to com-
plete the task accurately.
When activated together in complex social situations, the
two networks may also directly influence each other.
Indeed, when confronted with others’ distress, the AI,
which is activated for negative affect sharing, inhibits
activity in TPJ, an important hub of the mentalizing
network [27]. This reduction in TPJ activity is related
to impaired ToM performance [27]. The adaptive value
of this inhibitory mechanism in salient, emotional situa-









Neural networks underlying empathy, compassion and Theory of Mind. The
(red), and Theory of Mind (green) are presented. Abbreviations: AI, anterior 
prefrontal cortex; GP, globus pallidus; mOFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex; m
posterior cingulate cortex; Put, putamen; sgACC, subgenual anterior cingula
supramarginal gyrus; TP, temporal poles; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; VS
www.sciencedirect.com external world [39]. It has, however, also been discussed
as important in psychopathology, for instance in border-
line personality disorder for which a stress related men-
talizing deficit has been hypothesized [40].
Self-other distinction
The distinction of self and other constitutes an important
element of both empathy and ToM, as it enables the
differentiation between one’s own emotional or mental
states and the states shared with others. Failure of self-
other distinction results in a blending of these states,
thereby inducing an egocentricity bias, the tendency to
project one’s own emotional or mental state on someone
else [41,42], or an altercentric bias, the influence of others’
states on judgments about oneself [43]. Cognitive ego-
centricity occurs when the own knowledge about a situa-
tion influences the reasoning about what someone else
thinks about the situation [42], but can also affect simple
decisions about the visual perspective of another [44].
Emotional egocentricity occurs when one’s own emo-
tional state influences the judgment of someone else’s
affective state [41]. On a neural level, the right TPJ seems
to be critical to overcome cognitive egocentricity [45]. It
is also functionally connected to other parts of the ToM
neural network, such as the medial and ventrolateral PFC
and the PCC [45,46]. Overcoming emotional egocentric-
ity involves a slightly anterior temporoparietal region in
the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) [41]. Correspond-
ingly, disruption of rSMG activity using transcranial mag-
netic stimulation leads to increased emotional egocen-
tricity [41]. Interestingly, the SMG (see Figure 2) is also
part of a different functional connectivity network with
extensive connections to the AI [47]. Moreover, increased
coupling of SMG to dorsolateral PFC has been related to a
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 separable neural networks underlying empathy (blue), compassion
insula; aMCC, anterior middle cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral
PFC, medial prefrontal cortex; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; PCC,
te cortex; SN, substantia nigra; STS, superior temporal sulcus; SMG,
, ventral striatum; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
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4 Emotion-memory interactions[46]. Thus, temporoparietal regions seem to play a crucial
role in overcoming egocentricity, possibly contributing to
self-other distinction. The activation of SMG and TPJ in
complex empathy and ToM paradigms, respectively
[25], corresponds with the crucial role of self-other
distinction for both capacities.
Social behavior
Empathy and ToM provide us with an understanding of
our interaction partners’ emotional and cognitive states,
thereby forming the basis for flexible interactive behavior
and social decision making. Lately, neuroscientific
research has focused on the relationship between social
emotions and social cognition in predicting prosocial
behaviors [48,49]. For instance, using donation choices
for charity organizations, a recent study [48] showed
that an extensive cortical network is involved in forming
such prosocial decisions. Specifically, AI activity pre-
dicted generous donations when participants reported
empathic feelings for the charity’s goal before, while
TPJ activity predicted donations, when participants took
the perspective of the organization’s cause [48].
Remarkably, empathy and ToM measurements from
an independent task, were also related to these functions’
role in donation decisions, suggesting that stable individ-
ual propensities are involved in prosocial behavior. In
contrast, impairments in empathy or ToM have been
associated with antisocial behavior, for instance to hyper-
aggression [18,37,50]. While empathy may be related to
prosociality, a particular outcome of empathy — empathic
distress — describes the intense sharing of other’s emo-
tions and may be detrimental, because it can result in own
suffering as well as in asocial or even antisocial effects,
such as aggressive verbal behavior [18]. Short-term con-
templative training in compassion increases helping, even
when it is costly [51]. In contrast to empathic distress,
compassion reduces punishment behavior in long-term
compassion meditation practitioners even when they
were themselves the victim of fairness violations [52].
The critical property of compassion may be that it coun-
teracts negative emotion elicited by experiencing others’
suffering through positive emotion generation, thereby
acting as an emotion regulation strategy [14,15,53]. The
direct comparison of compassion to the most widely
investigated emotion regulation strategy — reappraisal
— showed that in well-trained long-term meditators,
cognitive reappraisal was most efficient in reducing neg-
ative affect, but compassion induction worked through
up-regulation of positive affect and associated networks
in the brain [14]. On a neural level, compassion was
accompanied by activations in reward and positive emo-
tion related networks [14]. Reappraisal on the other hand
yielded activity in a fronto-parietal network associated
with cognitive control and attention regulation [54]. The
different brain activation patterns are, thus, in line with
the hypothesis that reappraisal down-regulates negative
affect mainly via executive and cognitive controlCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6 networks and compassion increases positive affect to
buffer negative affect through the active generation of
positive emotions via reward-related and affiliation-
related brain circuitries.
Concluding remarks
In the present paper, we have suggested that the social
brain is supported by different functions and underlying
neuronal networks and that it is important to differentiate
between socio-affective versus socio-cognitive routes to
the understanding of others. Sharing affective states with
another person (empathy), feeling concern for another
(compassion) and reasoning about another person’s men-
tal state (ToM) are separable on a conceptual, behavioral
and neural level; strong empathizers are not necessarily
proficient mentalizers and each domain may be selec-
tively impaired in psychopathologies such as autism or
psychopathy. Furthermore, an original adaptive empathic
response to the suffering of others can lead to a mal-
adaptive response, that is, empathic distress which can be
reversed by learning how to turn empathy into compas-
sion. Compassion can thus be viewed as an emotion-
regulation strategy that buffers negative affect through
the active generation of positive affect relying on reward-
related and affiliation-related brain circuitries. Despite
the separability of socio-affective and socio-cognitive
functions, these social capacities are jointly activated
and interact in complex social situations. In synthesis,
the evidence supports a detailed view of the social mind,
not as a monolithic ‘social intelligence’, but as dynamic
interplay between different functions and subserving
neuronal networks that enable in different ways to engage
in prosocial behavior.
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